




Director of
Central Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

7 May 1979

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
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


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
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NAMIBIA: National Assembly Proposal

The Namibian Constituent Assembly has passed a resolution that asks South Africa to reconstitute the body as a national assembly that would exercise legislative functions subject to a veto by the South African Administrator General for Namibia. The resolution proposes that 15 representatives of the centrist groups that boycotted the election of the Constituent Assembly last December be added to the 50 Constituent Assembly members for the new body. The terms of the resolution suggest that South African Prime Minister Botha is trying to mollify both the Namibian leaders who want to set up a strong interim government and those who want the UN transitional program to be implemented with some modifications. [REDACTED]

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The dominant Democratic Turnhalle Alliance pushed through the proposal following the collapse late last month of efforts to persuade leaders of the Namibian National Front and the South-West Africa People's Organization-Democrats to participate in an interim government. Botha very likely induced the Turnhalle leaders to forego a call for an interim government in return for South Africa's probable acceptance of a national assembly with such limited powers that it would not hinder further South African diplomatic efforts to obtain modifications in the UN truce plan. [REDACTED]

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Botha probably hopes the principal centrist leaders will accept the proffered seats in a national assembly, rather than see them filled by others who might be more responsive to guidance from Pretoria. The resolution does not specify a target date for setting up the assembly, and Botha can well afford to suspend implementation if the resolution spurs the centrist leaders to resume bargaining with the Turnhalle leaders. The National Front reportedly has been offered at least nine of the new seats. [REDACTED]

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Botha probably also hopes that the Conservative election victory in the UK will result in some shifts in the five Western nations' approach to the Namibia problem. Such a temporizing diplomatic strategy would be facilitated by prolonged bargaining among the Namibian political leaders over their roles in the projected national assembly. [REDACTED]

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USSR: 1979 Census Results

Preliminary results on the 1979 Soviet census released last week show a marked slowing in the rate of population increase during the 1970s. As of January, there were 262.4 million people in the USSR, 20.7 million more than the 1970 census figure. This represents an annual increase of slightly less than 1 percent, compared to an increase of 1.3 percent between 1959, the year of the previous census, and 1970. This decline is expected to continue into the 1980s as the unusually underpopulated generation of the 1960s matures. More than three decades after World War II drastically reduced the male population, the male-female ratio is not yet normal. []

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All 15 union republics experienced some decrease in the rate of growth during the 1970s. The ranking of republics according to the rate of increase in population changed little from 1970 to 1979. The greatest increases, 27 to 31 percent, occurred in the Turkic republics of Central Asia, and the least in the three Slavic republics. The Turkic and other Muslim groups now comprise an estimated 18 percent of the population, up from 14 percent in 1970. By the year 2000 they will probably make up one-third. []

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The male-female ratio is still out of balance because of a rising mortality rate among males 25 to 40 years old. The increasing death rate among these young males is presumably due to higher levels of alcoholism, industrial accidents, increasing cardiovascular disease, and malignancies. []

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Preliminary data on the urban-rural distribution of the country's population show that 62 percent lives in urban areas, compared to 56 percent in 1970. The number of cities with population above 1 million increased from 10 to 18. Migrants from rural places accounted for more than half the increase in urban population between 1970 and 1979. In some cases they left severe labor shortages in their wake--particularly in the non-Black-Earth regions of the Russian Republic. []

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

JORDAN-US: Relations after the Peace Treaty

//The coolness that has marked US-Jordanian relations in recent months stems largely from differing perceptions of Jordan's role in regional affairs. The Jordanians emphasize the constraints that prevent King Hussein from becoming involved in the West Bank - Gaza autonomy negotiations.

//The Jordanians simply do not believe that negotiations on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza Strip can lead to a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. They have no faith in Israeli willingness to negotiate the kind of concessions--and ultimately to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza--that Jordan believes necessary to justify the risks it would run by entering the negotiations now.

//The Jordanians believe their involvement in autonomy talks might trigger disorder among the Palestinian half of the population and make them targets for terrorist operations by the Palestine Liberation Organization. They also believe they would face a cutoff of Arab aid, with no assurance that the US would replace it, and would provoke the hostility of Syria and Iraq.

//The divergence between US and Jordanian perceptions of recent events

has contributed to the chill in relations.

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[REDACTED]

//Controversy over some of Hussein's recent press statements has added to the discord. The Jordanians maintain that the King's statements--which have criticized the US role in the Middle East and called for Soviet participation in the negotiating process--are intended only to emphasize Jordan's view of the inadequacy of the Camp David accords and should not be interpreted as being anti-US. [REDACTED]

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//Hussein has apparently decided that he has nothing to gain from open feuding with the US, and he has started to play down the differences. Jordanian officials have expressed interest in cooperating with the US in regional matters such as Lebanon and the Yemens, and the recent strident press criticism of the US has tapered off.//

[REDACTED]

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//The Jordanians will continue to keep their distance from the autonomy plan. As long as Arab reaction to the autonomy plan remains overwhelmingly hostile, Jordan will try to keep on good terms with hardline states. It will continue its year-old "dialogue" with the PLO, although it will probably not relax its ban on PLO political organizing or a PLO military presence in Jordan. [REDACTED]

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//Behind the scenes, Hussein will probably push for returning the peace negotiations to some international forum and will be seeking US support for such a move. He expects--and probably hopes--that the autonomy negotiations will fail, but wants to keep the overall negotiating process in motion. Hussein knows that, without continuing US involvement, the area could drift toward turmoil--something he wants to avoid at all costs. Thus, in the coming months he will be looking for a strategy that allows him to stay out of the autonomy negotiations but keep US interest in the area high. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] 6
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